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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Bodily  self-attribution,  the  feeling  that a body  (or  parts  of  it)  is owned  by  me, is  a fundamental  component
of  one’s  self.  Previous  studies  have  suggested  that,  in addition  to a necessary  multi-sensory  stimulation,
the sense  of body  ownership  is  determined  by the  body  model,  a representation  of our body  in the  brain.
It  is  however  unclear  what  features  constitute  the  body  representation.  To examine  this issue,  we  ﬁrst
brieﬂy  review  results  on  embodiment  of  artiﬁcial  limbs,  whole  bodies  and  virtual  avatars  to  understandeywords:
ody ownership
elf-attribution
ubber hand illusion
ody model
mbodiment
the  apparent  anatomical,  volumetric  and spatial  constraints  associated  with  the  sense  of ownership
toward  external  entities.  We  then  discuss  how  considering  limb  functionality  in  the  body  model  can
provide  an  integrated  explanation  for most  of  the  varied  embodiment  results  in  literature.  We  propose
that  the self-attribution  of  an entity  may  be  determined,  not  just  by  its physical  features,  but  by whether
the  entity  can  afford  actions  that  the  brain  has  associated  with  the  limb  which  it replaces.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an open  access  article  under  the CC
ction affordance BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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. Introduction 1972) over the course of the human existence. The Oxford dictio-Who  am I? The question of what is our self and how our brain
eﬁnes self has been a fundamental motivation that has driven phi-
osophy (Kant, 1781; Descartes and Cottingham, 2013), psychology
James, 1890; Jung, 1971) and religion (Ra¯hula, 1959; Sivananda,
∗ Corresponding author at: CNRS-AIST JRL (Joint Robotics Laboratory),
MI3218/CRT, Tsukuba Central 1, 1-1-1 Umezono, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8560, Japan.
el.: +81 9081241047.
E-mail address: gans gs@hotmail.com (G. Ganesh).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neures.2015.11.001
168-0102/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access
c-nd/4.0/).nary (Oxford English Dictionary, 2010) deﬁnes self as “a person’s
essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially con-
sidered as the object of introspection or reﬂexive action.” However,
it will be generally agreed that this simple deﬁnition is far more
complex than perceived. Self can be deﬁned in multiple terms from
one’s physiology, mental and emotional status to beliefs, social sta-
tus and spiritual being (closely related to the concept of soul). It can
include various facets like self-image, self-perception, ideal-self and
self esteem. For instance William James, the well-known 19th cen-
tury philosopher, divided self into two  main categories. The “Me”
self, and the “I” self (James, 1890). The “Me” self, which he further
 article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
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Fig. 1. The rubber hand illusion (RHI) has been a standard to investigate the sense of ownership over the past decade. (A) The original RHI involves simultaneous brushing
of  the real hand and a rubber hand in view of the subject. (B) The illusion is not induced if the rubber hand is replaced by a “non-corporeal object” (Guterstam et al., 2013;
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rom  (Guterstam et al., 2013).
ivided into the material self, the social self, and the spiritual self,
efers to the aspects of someone that come from that person’s expe-
iences. On the other hand, James saw the “I” self as the thinking
elf and linked this self to the soul or mind of a person.
In this short review, we will limit ourselves to discussing bodily
elf-attribution and speciﬁcally to what constitutes the body model
tilized by the brain for self-attribution. The self we will explore
s probably best deﬁned as the bodily self image and by James
illiams’s deﬁnition, part of the “material self”.
Bodily self-attribution or body-ownership is a crucial component
f the self. Body ownership refers to the special perceptual status
f one’s own body, which makes bodily sensations seem unique to
neself (Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris, 2010), that is, the feeling that
ertain limbs and certain sensed body belongs to me.  It is well
stablished that illusory changes in the feeling of body ownership
an be generated by correlated stimulations in different combina-
ions of sensory modalities (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Armel and
amachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2006;
alsh et al., 2011; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). However, while
ulti-sensory stimulations are necessary, they are arguably not
ufﬁcient to induce the feeling of ownership. Multiple studies have
hown that the feeling of ownership toward an artiﬁcial limb is
dditionally modulated by its anatomical (Tsakiris and Haggard,
005; Haans et al., 2008; Guterstam et al., 2013), volumetric (Pavani
nd Zampini, 2007), and spatial (Pavani et al., 2000; Austen et al.,
004; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini
nd Haggard, 2007; Lloyd, 2007) features. These results support the
elief that, in addition to the bottom-up multi-sensory perception,
elf-attribution is regulated by a top-down perceptual body model,  a
eference description of our body or/and the space around it in our
rain (De Vignemont et al., 2006; Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 2010;
lanke, 2012; Moseley et al., 2012). The speciﬁc bodily features that
he body model encodes, however, remain unclear.
In this article we will examine what minimal features can
xplain how our brain represents our body. First, we will brieﬂy
eview studies on embodiment of artiﬁcial limbs, whole bodies and
irtual avatars to explore the apparent “top-down” constraints
ssociated with the illusion of body ownership. While the deﬁ-
ition of embodiment is varied, at least in the case of artiﬁcial
imbs and bodies, embodiment is generally agreed to include the
ense of ownership. We will thus assume embodiment to represent
wnership in this article. Following the review, we will propose
imb functionality as the key feature of the body model, and dis-
uss how a body model considering functionality can explain most
bservations by previous studies.. The rubber hand and beyond
Our understanding of body ownership has increased signiﬁ-
antly in the last decade after the discovery of the rubber hand an empty volume of safe. Figures from experiments reconstructed by the authors
illusion (RHI) (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) which enables controlled
manipulation of limb ownership in the laboratory environment.
As is customary with articles dealing with body-ownership, we
too will start with a brief description of the RHI. In this illusion,
Botvinick and Cohen showed that synchronous touches, applied to
a rubber hand in full view of the participant, and the real hand hid-
den behind a screen, produce the sensation that the touches felt
originate from the rubber hand, leading to a feeling of ownership
of the artiﬁcial rubber hand. In contrast, the illusion of ownership
is absent if the touches on the rubber hand and the real hand are
not synchronized.
Since the ﬁrst experiment, multiple versions of the RHI have
examined how different physical and spatial features of the rubber
hand inﬂuence the illusion (Fig. 1). While the similarity of physical
features of an embodied artiﬁcial limb and the real limb does aid
self-attribution, subjects are able to embody limbs with different
physical features. It has been shown that color does not determine
embodiment of an artiﬁcial limb (Holmes et al., 2006; Longo et al.,
2009). For instance, Holmes et al. (2006) found that a white rubber
hand produced similar levels of embodiment in white and black
skin participants. Longo et al. (2009) found that objective similar-
ity (as measured by skin luminance, hand shape, and third-person
similarity ratings) did not affect fake limb embodiment. Similarly,
a rubber hand with a different skin texture can be embodied, even
though the embodiment scores are reportedly lower (Haans et al.,
2008). In regard to size, it has been shown that a rubber hand larger
than one’s real hand (Pavani and Zampini, 2007) and longer arms
(Schaefer et al., 2007; Kilteni et al., 2012) can be embodied by sub-
jects, while interestingly, a rubber hand smaller in size than one’s
real hand is not (Pavani and Zampini, 2007). Smaller size though is
no problem when it comes to whole body embodiment as shown
by an attractive study by Ehrsson and colleagues (Van der Hoort
et al., 2011) where they embodied subjects into dolls ranging in
size from 30 cm to 400 cm.
Similar results have been reported for whole body embodiment
in virtual reality (VR). Studies that use this technology typically
induce embodiment by giving users visual feedback in ﬁrst person
perspective of the virtual environment, which is displayed in accor-
dance to their head movements. VR users are generally able to see
the virtual limbs of their avatars in a coincident location with that of
their real limbs. Additionally, full-body identiﬁcation with the digi-
tal self-representation (i.e. the avatar) can be achieved by reﬂecting
the avatar’s body in mirrors or other reﬂecting surfaces (González-
Franco et al., 2010; Aymerich-Franch et al., 2014), so users gain
knowledge of how they look like in the virtual environment. Resem-
blance of the artiﬁcial body to a human body improves embodiment
into the avatar (Maselli and Slater, 2013), and the feeling of Pres-
ence (discussed also in the next section) in the virtual world (Eastin,
2006; Ratan et al., 2007; Ratan, 2011). Furthermore, customization
of avatars increases the extent to which people feel connected to
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heir avatars (Lim and Reeves, 2009; Ratan, 2011). However, VR
sers are able to identify with human-looking avatars even when
hey present different visual characteristics than their real selves
Kim, 2011; Aymerich-Franch et al., 2012; Maister et al., 2014). For
nstance, ownership can be induced over a body of a different race,
ge, or gender (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Maister et al., 2014).
. The corporeal shape issue
Contradictory results exist on whether a “non-corporeal” entity
an be embodied and induce a sense of ownership.
Although similarity of the virtual avatar improves the sense of
mbodiment in VR (Maselli and Slater, 2013), studies have shown
hat bodies with extra limbs (Schaefer et al., 2009; Won  et al.,
015), a tail (Steptoe et al., 2013), animal bodies (Ahn et al., 2015)
nd even non-anthropomorphic shapes (Aymerich-Franch, 2010)
an be embodied by subjects. Similarly, avatar studies with robots
ave shown that humans feel identiﬁed with very realistic androids
Nishio et al., 2012) as well as non-human looking humanoid robots
Aymerich-Franch et al., 2015) and parts of a robot (results pending
ublication).
These studies seem to contradict the body-part or full-body illu-
ion studies which highlight a drastic reduction in the illusion when
 non-corporeal object, such as when a wooden stick (Tsakiris and
aggard, 2005), a rubber sheet (Haans et al., 2008), a wooden slab
Guterstam et al., 2013) or a cuboid (Lenggenhager et al., 2007),
s used instead of a fake hand or body. The RHI is also attenuated
hen the handedness of the visible rubber hand and the stimu-
ated hand are not congruent (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Petkova and
hrsson, 2009). But again other studies have claimed that non-
orporeal objects such as a box (Hohwy and Paton, 2010) or a table
Armel and Ramachandran, 2003) can be embodied, apparently if
ollowed by the classic RHI with a human-looking rubber hand. It
s also relevant to mention here a RHI study (Ehrsson, 2009) that
emonstrated that simultaneous brushing of two rubber hands in
ynchrony with a subject’s real right hand induces an experience of
aving two right hands in the subject. Furthermore, a recent study
xhibited that subjects are able to embody a volume of empty space,
ith no obvious shape, when presented with simultaneous brush
trokes from one brush on their hidden hand and another a few
entimeters above a table (Guterstam et al., 2013).
. Spatial constraints to embodiment
There is however, general agreement on the spatial constraints
ffecting embodiment of artiﬁcial limbs and bodies. RHI exper-
ments show that the embodiment of a rubber hand does not
ccur when the rubber hand is located outside the participant’s
eri-personal space (Lloyd, 2007) or when its posture is spatially
ncongruent with respect to the real hand (Ehrsson et al., 2004;
sakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007).
On the other hand, spatial congruency between the self and
he body can be disrupted in full-body illusions involving one’s
wn body seen from a different perspective (Ehrsson, 2007;
enggenhager et al., 2007), mannequins (Guterstam and Ehrsson,
012), virtual body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) and robots (Nishio
t al., 2012; Alimardani et al., 2013; Aymerich-Franch et al., 2015).
tudies in virtual reality have also explored a related phenomena
f Presence (Heeter, 1992; Steuer, 1992; Lombard and Ditton, 1997;
ee, 2004), which refers to the feeling of “being there”, in the
irtual world (Lombard and Ditton, 1997), and self-presence, a sub-
imension of Presence which describes the state in which the virtual
elf is experienced as the actual self (Lee, 2004; Ratan, 2010).
hen people experience presence and self-presence, their behav-
or within a virtual environment in relation to virtual objects andience Research 104 (2016) 31–37 33
virtual people is very similar to that in the physical world (Bailenson
et al., 2001, 2003; Garau et al., 2005), even if none of them actu-
ally exist. In collaborative virtual environments, people physically
located in distant places are able to meet in a single virtual space
and also experience a feeling of ‘co-presence’ (Bailenson, 2006). If
we can consider these behavioral modiﬁcations to indicate embod-
iment, then the observations from all these studies taken together
indicate that the spatial coincidence between the real and virtual
world, or the real and virtual body, is not a necessary condition to
experience whole body embodiment.
5. First person perspective
Finally, ﬁrst person perspective is a crucial requirement to cre-
ate the illusion of embodiment over a virtual body (Maselli and
Slater, 2013). For instance, it has been shown that a ﬁrst person
perspective of a life-sized virtual human female body that appears
to substitute a male subjects’ own  body is sufﬁcient to generate a
body transfer illusion (Slater et al., 2010). Conversely, when third
person perspective is used over an artiﬁcial body the illusion of
embodiment does not occur, even when the set up includes visuo-
tactile synchronization between the real and the artiﬁcial body
(Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al., 2010; Petkova et al.,
2011).
6. A functional body model hypothesis
Our review highlighted results that exhibit that, in addition to
the multi-sensory integration, embodiment of an artiﬁcial entity
(limb or body) is also modulated by various physical and spa-
tial features of the entity. These results support the presence of
a “body model”, a top down reference of body features that our
brain uses to identify our self, and which modulates embodiment
of external entities. But what features does the body model refer
to? Traditionally the model has been suggested to represent visual,
anatomical and structural properties of the body (Schwoebel and
Coslett, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007) and the space around
the body (Makin et al., 2008). But the variance in the embodiment
results, as summarized by our review, makes it difﬁcult to iden-
tify a single physical body representation that would explain all
the observations. It is of course possible that these observations
are simply not related, and are a result of an interaction between
multiple body representations. However, that said, a synthesis and
integrated representation may  still be possible.
We  suggest that a body model considering not just the phys-
ical features but also the functionality of limbs, can provide an
integrated explanation for most of the varied embodiment results
observed with rubber hands, and surrogate bodies. We  propose
that the top-down regulation of embodiment of an entity is deter-
mined by whether the entity can afford actions that the brain
expects from the limb which the entity replaces (in terms of the
perceived multi-sensory stimulations). This idea is motivated by
the popular concept of “affordance” in sensory perception (Gibson,
1977). There is however a major difference between our proposal
and Gibson’s concept of affordance. Affordance refers to a repre-
sentation of external objects in terms of the actions, deﬁned by
one’s limb characteristics, environmental constraints and motor
skill, which can be performed on it by an individual. On the other
hand, here we  propose that the body model is a representation of
the limb characteristics in terms of speciﬁc actions it requires tohypothesis, our brain attributes a perceived entity as our limb (or
as our body) if the physical properties of the entity are sufﬁcient
to afford certain actions the brain has associated to that limb (or
body).
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. In regard to previous results
As an example, reaching and grasping are probably the two
mportant actions that a healthy person’s brain associates with
is/her arm and hand. A body model considering limb function-
lity would predict that the sensitivity of any physical feature of
n artiﬁcial hand/arm (like a rubber hand), on how difﬁcult (slow)
t is to embody and be attributed as one’s own arm, will depend
n how much the particular feature impedes or limits reaching
nd/or grasping in a real hand. Consistent with this prediction,
HI has been shown to be possible with rubber hands of differ-
nt color (Holmes et al., 2006; Longo et al., 2009), texture (Haans
t al., 2008), and gender (anecdotal observations) as these fea-
ures do not directly affect hand/arm reach or grasp. On the other
and, a wooden stick (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), wooden slab
Guterstam et al., 2013) or rubber sheet (Haans et al., 2008) with
o ﬁngers would make grasp impossible and hence are not easily
ttributed as one’s arm.
Substituting two hands and arms for one does not signiﬁcantly
eteriorate its functionality (and may  be seen to increases it) and
ence multiple rubber hands can be embodied at one time (Ehrsson,
009). Artiﬁcial arms and hands, that are longer/larger than the real
and, would arguably constrain actions less than shorter arms or
maller hands; for example smaller limbs would restrict reacha-
ility of the extremities of one’s usual reachable space. For this
eason, embodiment of limbs is less sensitive to longer artiﬁcial
rms (Schaefer et al., 2007; Kilteni et al., 2012) and larger rub-
er hands (Pavani and Zampini, 2007) than smaller rubber hands
Pavani and Zampini, 2007). Finally a change from right to left hand
r vice versa would severely affect how an arm would perform grip
asks and hence the RHI is affected by the handedness of the rub-
er hand with respect to the real hand (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Petkova
nd Ehrsson, 2009).
Most of the whole body illusion and VR results can be similarly
xplained by considering action affordance. For our brain, our body
ffords actions like reaching, locomotion and head movement. A
uboid with no limbs will therefore not be attributed easily as one’s
ody (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). On the other hand, it is easier
or the brain to embody avatars that can afford these actions in
he given environment, even when the avatars are obviously non-
uman (Ahn et al., 2015), or different in size and gender (Petkova
nd Ehrsson, 2008; Maister et al., 2014)
. Coordinate frames and spatial constraints
A body model considering action affordance implicitly couples
he human limb features to the space around the limb and body.
ctions are expected to be deﬁned in (probably multiple) body and
imb centric coordinates, the peri-personal space (Rizzolatti et al.,
997) being arguably one of the key spaces in question. It thus
ollows obviously that artiﬁcial limbs outside one’s peri-personal
pace will not easily be attributed as one’s own (Lloyd, 2007), and
hat visual perspective is a critical determinant of embodiment
Maselli and Slater, 2013). Furthermore, a recent framework put
orth by Cisek and Kalaska (2010) suggests the presence of con-
tant competition between affordances in the brain for the selection
f a particular action at any instance (and posture). Considering
hat one’s current body posture would determine the ease with
hich different actions are afforded, it can be expected that the
mbodiment of artiﬁcial limbs is dependent on its postural congru-
ncy to the real limb (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard,
005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007). Though our proposal does
ot clearly explain the extreme sensitivity of the RHI to the rubber
and orientation as has been reported in (Costantini and Haggard,
007).ience Research 104 (2016) 31–37
Note that spatial constraints do not limit embodiment of whole
bodies as the spatial constraints are relative to the body (in body
and limb centric coordinates) that would shift with the body. Whole
body illusions have thus been observed to be insensitive to the spa-
tial location of the fake or virtual bodies (Lenggenhager et al., 2007;
Blanke, 2012). On the other hand, our model would predict whole
body embodiment to be sensitive to posture; it should be difﬁcult
to embody avatars with a signiﬁcantly different posture than the
real body.
The coordinate frames of action affordance can also explain why,
even though embodiment of a smaller rubber hand is difﬁcult,
embodiment of a smaller body (with multiple small limbs) can be
achieved with ease (Van der Hoort et al., 2011). In the presence of
a ﬁrst person perspective, a scaling down of the body size would
lead to the proportional shrinkage of the functional workspace
of the limbs (and the peri-personal space). Embodiment into the
smaller body with its smaller limbs is thus possible as the brain
(mis)perceives the shrinking of the whole body as a change in the
size of the environment (Van der Hoort et al., 2011) and not its
limbs.
9. The effects of agency
The role of action affordance in the body model highlights the
importance of agency on the embodiment of limbs. The sense of
agency, induced by movement synchronization between the real
and the artiﬁcial limb or body, has been utilized to induce the
illusion of ownership of artiﬁcial limbs (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Raz
et al., 2008; Dummer et al., 2009; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012;
Nishio et al., 2012; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014). It is believed that
the key feature enabling embodiment in these movement stud-
ies are the dynamic proprioceptive and haptic sensations induced
by the motion. These can substitute the tactile input, for exam-
ple from brush strokes in a regular RHI experiment, and enable
multi-sensory integration.
In addition to aiding the bottom-up multi-sensory integration,
we propose that the sense of agency also performs a crucial function
in regard to the body model; sense of agency can change our body
model by modulating the actions our brain associates to a particular
limb. Due to this bi-directional effect (bottom-up and top-down),
agency is a much stronger modus for inducing embodiment than
multi-sensory stimulations. This is probably the reason why  sub-
jects can even identify with non-anthropomorphic 3-D shapes in VR
when their movements were synchronized with the object move-
ments (Aymerich-Franch, 2012). The importance of the sense of
agency in embodiment would also explain the observed increase
in the RHI in the presence of agency (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012)
and the success agency has had in the induction of embodiment in
virtual environments (Slater et al., 2009; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010;
Spanlang et al., 2014).
Furthermore, if action affordance plays a key role in embod-
iment, then it can be concluded that artiﬁcial limbs that are
successfully embodied, are perceived by the brain as able to afford
the required actions. This view is consistent with the reports of
heightened sense of agency toward embodied rubber hands after
RHI (Longo et al., 2008), even when induction of the illusion does
not involve any movement.
10. A visual body image
Similar to affordance in perception literature, we  postulate that
one’s limbs are represented in the brain as a mapping, between the
visual limbs and the visual environment, through the actions the
limb affords. We  believe that a visual body image plays a fundamen-
tal role in the self- attribution process, as has also been previously
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iscussed by other studies (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Costantini
nd Haggard, 2007; Kammers et al., 2009). Vision is not required in
egard to the bottom-up multisensory stimulation (Ehrsson et al.,
005; Petkova et al., 2012), but a subject’s visual image (visual-
zation) of her body determines the top-down regulation of body
wnership.
We propose that visualization of a limb, aided by multisensory
epresentations is (at least one of the key reason) why subjects
an embody an empty volume of space (Guterstam et al., 2013).
he visualization is impeded when the space is not empty and is
eplaced by a non-corporeal object, hence leading to a reduction
n the embodiment (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Guterstam et al.,
013). We  would also suggest that the RHI induced by self touch and
ithout vision (Ehrsson et al., 2005; Petkova et al., 2012) is possible
ecause, in addition to the multi-sensory tactile and proprioceptive
timulation, the subjects are able to visualize the limb that they
eel they are touching. Lack of which, as would be expected from
lind subjects who have lost or distorted their visual image of their
ody, prevents self-attribution of self-touched limbs even though
he same multi-sensory stimulations are available (Petkova et al.,
012).
1. Hypothesis predictions for veriﬁcation
A body model considering limb functionality thus seems to
rovide an integrated explanation for various observations by pre-
ious self-attribution studies. But an obvious question to ask is
hether there are any predictions from the functional body model
ypothesis that can be used to validate it against previous non-
unctional model beliefs? We  discuss three veriﬁable predictions
ere.
First, the critical prediction of the functional body model
ypothesis is that the brain does not identify a limb or body just
y how it looks, but also by how it is used. Thus the model should
e veriﬁed by examining whether functional constraints on a real
imb alter what physical features in an artiﬁcial limb (that would
eplace it) impede its self-attribution. In their elegant monkey
tudy, Costantini et al. (2010) utilized such a functional constraint
o examine whether object affordances are affected by environ-
ental constraints on a subject’s action. They demonstrated that
isual observation of an object, which evokes motor neurons when
laced in the peri-personal space of monkey, fails to evoke the
otor neurons when a transparent barrier is placed between the
onkey and the object. However, while the constraint on object
ffordances (object being distinct from self) can be extrinsic, as the
ody model is the representation of one’s self, we believe the con-
traint on the limb functionality would have to be intrinsic, from
ithin one’s body and on the real hand (and not the rubber hand).
ne possibility for an intrinsic constraint is the state of paralysis.
f the functional body model hypothesis is true then individuals
ith loss of motor function (and not sensory function such that
hey can feel the multi-sensory stimulation) in an arm (and hand)
hould more easily embody a wooden stick or slab than healthy
ndividuals (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Guterstam et al., 2013).
cute motor axonal neuropathy, acute inﬂammatory demyeli-
ating polyneuropathy and pure motor stroke/hemiparesis are
xamples of diseases that present predominantly motor, and not
ensory, paralysis. This prediction however remains to be tested.
Second, though we concentrated on ‘action’ functions in this
rticle as these are the most relevant for human limbs, functionality
an also be unrelated to action. Taking an example cited before, RHI
s not affected by the color and texture of the rubber hand (Holmes
t al., 2006; Haans et al., 2008; Longo et al., 2009) because actions,
ike reaching and grasping, that constitute the major functions of a
uman hand, are not affected by color or texture. On the other hand,ience Research 104 (2016) 31–37 35
the functional body model hypothesis would predict that animals
that rely on camouﬂage should be more sensitive to the color of the
artiﬁcial limb during embodiment. RHI (or equivalent) studies with
animals would be required to conﬁrm this prediction.
Third, if our brain deﬁnes a limb by its action affordance, then
it would be expected that artiﬁcial limbs that are successfully
embodied, are perceived by the brain to afford the required actions.
Embodiment of artiﬁcial limbs can thus be expected to inﬂuence not
just the sensory but also the motor-sensory representations of the
limb, as these are known to be essential for performing and control-
ling actions (Wolpert et al., 2011; Ganesh et al., 2013). Consistent
with this prediction, our recent studies (pending publication) show
modiﬁcations in the motor-sensory predictions, or forward mod-
els, after the embodiment of, both a corporeal rubber hand, as well
as a relatively non-corporeal robot hand.
12. Neural issues: what and where
Affordance represents a mapping between an object’s spatial
features, constraints of the environment it is in, and an individ-
ual’s own limb features and motor skill. This mapping is captured
by the actions the individual can perform on the object. Perception
of an object, according to Gibson, is not performed by individually
comparing its features with those stored in the brain. Object per-
ception represents a “pick up” of its affordance, the mapping as a
whole, by the brain. This concept is elucidated by a nice example
from a recent book, where the author states “. . .for a person who
has never encountered stairs before, there might be some ques-
tion as to why climbing up the incline would be desirable, but the
perceiver’s body would pick up the fact that it could use them to
go upward either way” (Hinton, 2014). Similarly, we  believe the
body model represents a mapping between the features that rep-
resent one’s limb/body and the actions associated with the limb.
Self-attribution is achieved by the brain by “picking up” and com-
paring affordances of an observed (artiﬁcial) limb to that stored for
the real limb in question.
The inferior parietal region has been associated with the
visual distinction of self from another (Ruby and Decety, 2001).
Somatosensory regions have also been isolated in regard to the dis-
tinction of the self (Ruby and Decety, 2001), body awareness (Hari
et al., 1998; Schwartz et al., 2005) and internal representation of
one’s body (Tsakiris et al., 2007; Tsakiris, 2010). These regions are
thus arguably important for the body model.
Interestingly, the inferior parietal region is adjacent to the ante-
rior intraparietal salcus (aIPS) which is known for its role in action
affordance in humans (Tunik et al., 2005). This view is backed by
monkey electrophysiological studies of the anterior intraparietal
area (AIP), which is suggested as being the functional equivalent to
a human aIPS (Culham et al., 2003, 2006; Frey et al., 2005). AIP has
connections to the premotor (F5) and has been suggested to play
a crucial role in the multi-sensory integration of object size and
shape (Murata et al., 1997; Raos et al., 2006; Maranesi et al., 2014)
and modulating corresponding motor action (Gallese et al., 1994;
Fogassi et al., 2001; Maranesi et al., 2014).
Furthermore, the inferior parietal has reciprocal connections
with the superior occipital gyrus, which has been previously
observed to be activated when the handedness of the rubber hand
is congruent to the real hand (Tsakiris et al., 2007). This region is
in the junction of the dorsal and ventral streams and is believed to
assimilate information related to visual object shapes and objectour functional body model hypothesis is true, then the body model
would probably be represented by the interactions between the
inferior parietal with occipital regions, and with the premotor and
somatosensory areas through the intraparietal salcus.
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3. Conclusion and future work
In this article we reviewed the results from RHI, whole body
llusions, and virtual reality studies to investigate the nature of the
ody model, the central representation of our limbs and body in
ur brain. We  proposed that the body model for self-attribution
ncludes a mapping between the limb features and actions that the
rain expects it to afford. Limb speciﬁc actions are likely learnt
y the brain through the course of development, by exploring
ne’s physiology and environment. These explorations are pos-
ible through both, observed and self-generated actions and can
nable the brain to understand not just the movement but also
he spatial constraints related to the limb actions. We  discussed
ow considering functionality allows for an integrated explanation
or the observed physical, spatial, and agency related constraints
n embodiment. However, though some evidence supporting the
roposal were discussed, the validation of the functional body
odel hypothesis requires a dedicated investigation of interactions
etween functionality and the sense of ownership, in line with the
uggestions in the Hypothesis predictions for veriﬁcation section.
We conclude by highlighting the fact that, in addition to limb
nd whole body embodiment, the functional body model hypoth-
sis is also consistent with ‘tool embodiment’ studies. Tool use
oes not lead to the self-attribution of the tools as part of one’s
ody, but results in modiﬁcations in the internal body representa-
ions, including the body schema (Cardinali et al., 2009, 2011; De
ignemont, 2010; Sposito et al., 2012; Ganesh et al., 2014), and
ulti-sensory interactions (Maravita et al., 2001; Holmes et al.,
007), similar to observations after the embodiment of artiﬁcial
imbs. Perceptual changes due to tools have been shown to present
nly when the tools lead to speciﬁc sensory consequences in rela-
ion to a task (Witt et al., 2005). Furthermore, the perceptual
hanges depend on the shape and functionality of the tool; when
 tool is used to estimate the size of an object rather than lift it
Cardinali et al., 2012) and when a stick rather than a light pointer
s used to point to a line center in a line bisection task (Berti and
rassinetti, 2000). Therefore similar to artiﬁcial limbs, tools are
mbodied only when they can afford the actions that are relevant to
 given task. However, further studies are needed in order to clar-
fy the similarities and differences between tools and artiﬁcial limb
mbodiment in order to evaluate how they can be understood in
egard to the self (De Vignemont, 2010).
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